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COMMENTS
THE ETHICS OF MOVING TO DISQUALIFY
OPPOSING COUNSEL FOR CONFLICT
OF INTEREST
A court, in exercise of its inherent powers of supervision,1 may
disqualify counsel found to be in conflict of interest with respect to a
case before the court. When opposing counsel is in a serious conflict of
interest, it is clearly the duty of an attorney to move for disqualifica-
tion. Some motions to disqualify opposing counsel, however, may be
nothing more than tactical devices to delay the proceedings or to re-
move opposing counsel, not because of the purported conflict of inter-
est, but because opposing counsel is dangerously competent. In such
cases a motion to disqualify is surely at least prima facie unethical.
This Comment will discuss criteria for distinguishing those situations in
which a motion to disqualify opposing counsel for conflict of interest is
ethically mandatory, ethically permissible, and ethically impermissible.
I. THE LAW OF DISQUALIFICATION FOR CONFLICT OF INTEREST
While it is beyond the scope of this Comment to discuss the details
of the law of disqualification,2 it is necessary to sketch the general con-
text in which the decision to move to disqualify opposing counsel is
made. In analyzing a conflict of interest situation it is useful to ask
what relations of counsel give rise to the conflict and who stands to be
harmed by that conflict. The relations giving rise to conflicts of interest
in disqualification cases include personal relations of the attorney,3
present representation of a potentially adverse party,4 and prior repre-
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1978) [hereinafter cited as CODE; Discipli-
nary Rules and Ethical Considerations therein hereinafter cited only by DR and EC numbers];
ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS [hereinafter cited as OPINIONS].
1. In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 266 (5th Cir. 1976); Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Indus., 345 F. Supp. 93, 95 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
2. See generaly Liebman, The Changing Law of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption
andPolicy, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 996 (1979).
3. See, e.g., Bachman v. Pertschuk, 437 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1977) (counsel also a member
of plaintiff class). See also DR 5-101(A).
4. See, e.g., Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976). See also EC 5-
14, -20; DR 5-105; H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 103-30 (1953).
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sentation of an adverse party.5 Parties who may be injured by the con-
flict of interest include the present client of the attorney moving to
disqualify opposing counsel, the present client of the attorney who is
the target of the motion,6 and third parties. The law with respect to
disqualification varies depending on the conflict relation and the poten-
tially harmed party. This Comment will focus on those cases in which
an attorney moves to disqualify opposing counsel because the opponent
previously represented the movant's client or has professional ties to
attorneys who previously represented the movant's client. These cases
are common among the reported disqualification cases, and the ethical
problems this Comment discusses will be more definite in this restricted
setting. The results of the discussion can be fairly easily extended to
other conflict disqualification contexts.
A. The Substantial Relationshio Test.
A court may disqualify counsel when the subject matter of a case
bears a "substantial relationship" to a matter in which counsel previ-
ously advised or represented the presently adverse party.7 A "substan-
tial relationship" should be understood as a relationship in which it is
possible that the attorney obtained confidential information from the
former client.8 This reading of the test may be inferred from the most
frequently cited justification for disqualification under the substantial
relationship test: protection of client confidences, which in turn pre-
serves client trust in the attorney and furthers free communication be-
tween client and attorney.9 When the substantial relationship exists,
the court will irrebuttably presume that the attorney received confiden-
tial information relevant to the present case.'0 Evidence describing the
5. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 90 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1937). See generally Note, Attor-
ney's Conflict of Interests: Representation ofInterest Adverse to That of Former Client, 55 B.U. L.
REv. 61 (1975); Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 1243 (1957).
6. In these cases the requirements for disqualification will be high if the client, after full
disclosure, chooses to continue to be represented by the counsel who is the subject of the disquali-
fication motion. Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290, 293 (6th Cir. 1979) (re-
quirihg "real and substantial harm").
7. This test was enunciated in T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp.
265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
8. Aronson, Conflict oInterest, 52 WASH. L. REv. 807, 834 (1977).
9. See, e.g., First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390,396 (7th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Under DR 4-101(B),
[e]xcept when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) Reveal a
confidence or secret of his client. (2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disad-
vantage of the client. (3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of
himself or of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
10. Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976); Government of India
v. Cook Indus., 422 F. Supp. 1057, 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), a id, 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978), and
cases cited therein.
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former counsel's information will not be admitted."
B. Vicarious Disquaification.
Disqualification is vicarious when a court disqualifies a lawyer be-
cause he or she was a member of a firm that previously represented the
adverse party or when a court disqualifies a firm because one of its
members previously represented the adverse party. The Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility endorses the concept of vicarious disqualifica-
tion in DR 5-105(D): "If a lawyer is required to decline employment or
to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner,
or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may
accept or continue such employment."' 2 The chief justification for this
rule is that lawyers in the same firm have strong professional, pecuni-
ary, and personal reasons for talking to each other about cases. 13 These
reasons are thought to be sufficient to extend the applicability of vicari-
ous disqualification to attorneys sharing office space' 4 and to student
law clerks.15
In the view of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility, DR 5-105 extends disqualification to the firm without im-
puting the attorney's knowledge to the firm.16 The courts, however,
have generally followed the seminal 1955 case, Laskey Bros. of West
Virginia, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,17 basing vicarious disqualifica-
tion on an irrebuttable presumption of transfer of information from the
attorney to the firm of which he or she is then a member. If, however, a
vicariously disqualified partner leaves the firm and joins another, the
presumption is rebuttable, and his or her new partners will not neces-
sarily be disqualified. "[T]hey need show only that the vicariously dis-
qualified partner's knowledge was imputed, not actual."'U
This second stage rebuttability of the imputation of confidential
information lessens the rigors of the vicarious disqualification doctrine.
Recent decisions have restricted the doctrine further. Despite the une-
quivocal language of DR 5-105, the United States district court in Sil-
11. It is argued that permitting evidence on this question would defeat the purpose of preser-
vation of confidences and trusts. Government of India v. Cook Indus., 422 F. Supp. at 1060.
12. DR 5-105(D). See also OPINIONS No. 342, at 1 (1975).
13. OPINIONS No. 342, at I n.2 (1975).
14. See OPINIONS No. 104, at 356-57 (1934).
15. See, e.g., American Roller Co. v. Budinger, 513 F.2d 982 (3d Cir. 1975). See also A.B.A.
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS No. 1092 (1968); H, DRINKER, supra note
4, at 107.
16. OPINIONS No. 342, at 8 n.25 (1975).
17. 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956).
18. American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1971).
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ver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motors Corp.19 declined to disqualify
an attorney who, as a young associate with another firm, had played a
minor role in the tainting litigation. The court rejected the Laskey doc-
trine of irrebuttably imputed knowledge within the firm by refusing to
impute to the lawyer his former colleagues' knowledge. "The law must
reject defendants' suggestion that for purposes of disqualification, in an
organization as large as Kelley Drye, every associate is charged with
the knowledge of the confidences of every lawyer in the flrm2"
20
In affirming Silver Chrysler, the Second Circuit emphasized two
reasons for limiting vicarious disqualification: the right to counsel of
one's choice and the importance of retaining mobility for lawyers
whose careers start in large firms. Concern for the right to choose
counsel is a factor in nearly all decisions denying disqualification mo-
tions. "Motions to disqualify opposing counsel are disfavored. Dis-
qualification has a serious and immediate adverse effect by denying the
client his choice of counsel."'2 ' Several authorities have recognized that
the effect of rigorous vicarious disqualification on the right to choice of
counsel is particularly serious when the available choices are otherwise
restricted, as they may be in a specialized legal field.22 Similar re-
stricted supply problems may arise in isolated geographical areas for
indigent clients23 and, in effect, for clients with long-established rela-
tionships with a particular counsel.
There also seems to be increasing judicial sensitivity to the career
problems vicarious disqualification can cause for attorneys, especially
attorneys who start their careers with large firms or with the govern-
ment and become specialists. 24 The Court of Claims, for example, has
expressed a desire to avoid vicarious disqualification rules that cause
the government lawyer to "infect all the members of any firm he join[s]
with all his own personal disqualifications," so that he or she "take[s]
19. 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), a'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
20. 370 F. Supp. at 587.
21. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 722, 724
(E.D.N.Y. 1979); see Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979).
22. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); see Emel
Indus. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 574-75 (2d Cir. 1973) (disqualification allowed despite rec-
ognition of problems of access to counsel specializing in patent law). See also OPINMONs No. 342,
at 4-5 (1975); Note, Disqualification of 4ttorneys/or Representing Interests Adverse to Former Cli-
ents, 64 YALE L.J. 917 (1955).
23. See Aronson, supra note 8, at 856-57.
24. Compare Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216
F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954), with Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d
Cir. 1975). See general, OPINIONs No. 342, at 10-12 (1975); Note, The Second Circuit andAttorney
Disqualoffcation-Silver Chrysler Steers in a New Direction, 44 FopDHAm L. REv. 130 (1975).
The argument against vicarious disqualification premised on lawyer mobility is set forth in a
frequently cited Yale Law Journal note, Note, supra note 22, at 928.
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on the status of a Typhoid Mary, and [is] reduced to sole practice under
the most unfavorable conditions. '25
Some courts have also recognized that rigorous vicarious disquali-
fication can pose monumental problems for the day-to-day functioning
of large firms. Since such firms "represent the largest corporations with
interests in all sectors of the economy, it is almost impossible to have an
important client or its subsidiary avoid some kind of legal relationship
with another client at some time."'2 6 It is for just this reason, of course,
that large firms are the targets of so many motions to disqualify for
conflict of interest. The district court in Silver Chrysler took the posi-
tion that "[a]ntitrust implications in unduly restricting the work of the
largest law firms' former associates are not insubstantial since these
firms have as clients corporations that control a major share of the
American economy. Large law firms may not protect their clients by
monopolizing young talent. '2 7
These concerns have led to a moderation in the judicial view of
vicarious disqualification.
[R]ecent prevailing legal precedent has rejected the harsh, hard-line
approach of irrebuttably imputing confidential disclosures, actual or
presumed, received by one member of a law firm to all members of
that law firm in favor of the more realistically equitable logic, at-
tuned to contemporary legal practices common to emerging law firms
of substantial size.28
Rigorous vicarious disqualification based on literal interpretation of
DR 5-105(D) will most probably continue to decline. When necessary
the lawyer with the direct conflict of interest will be "screened" from
the later case.29
25. Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977). The special problems of
vicarious disqualification of former government lawyers have given rise to a lively debate as to
whether DR 5-105(D) is to be liberally applied to the former governments lawyer's new firm. See
Note, Ethical Problemsfor the Law Firm of a Former Government Attorney: Firm or Individual
Disqualfication, 1977 DUKE L.J. 512; Commentary, The Disqualication Dilemma: DR 5-105(D)
ofthe Code of Professional Responsibility, 56 NEB. L. REv. 692 (1977).
26. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 588
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), a'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
27. 370 F. Supp. at 591 (citations omitted).
28. City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 210 (N.D.
Ohio), a'd, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977). A decision that runs counter to the prevailing trend, by
asserting that the size of the firm is irrelevant, is Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
580 F.2d 1311, 1318 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978). For a general discussion of the
relation of firm size to disqualification, see Liebman, supra note 2, at 1017-18.
29. See Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977); OPINIoNs No. 342, at 11
(1975). But see Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979) (rejecting the sufficiency of
screening where government lawyer might be tempted to conduct case so as to enhance future
private employment), rehearing en bane granted, No. 79-7042 (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 1979). The petition
for an en banc rehearing of the Armstrong case was supported by an amicus curiae brief by former
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C. The Appearance of Impropriety.
The trend away from strict vicarious disqualification is parallel to,
and in part the result of, a trend away from the strictest possible inter-
pretation and application of the Ninth Canon of the Code: "A lawyer
should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety." After
the adoption of the Code in 1969,30 judicial decisions on disqualifica-
tion frequently discussed the appearance of impropriety issue.3' The
lack of confidence in the legal profession that followed Watergate un-
doubtedly spurred interest in Canon Nine.32
The appearance of impropriety is a consideration that worked in
tandem with the "transmission of confidences" analysis in prior repre-
sentation disqualification cases. It helped justify, for example, the ir-
rebuttability of the presumption that confidences passed from client to
attorney. 33 In addition, because of appearance of impropriety consid-
erations, courts have ordered disqualification despite an original in-
formed acquiescence in the choice of the opposing counsel.34
There can be no doubt that Canon Nine remains an important
factor in disqualification cases, but recent decisions have shown a ten-
dency to require more than a bare appearance of impropriety. Thus,
one district court held that "[tihe possibility that an attorney's represen-
senior government lawyers. See Lawyers: Ease Conflicts Ruling, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 12, 1979, at 4,
col. 4.
30. CODE ii.
31. See Note, Ethical Considerations When an Attorney Opposes a Former Client: The Need
for a Realistic Application of Canon Nine, 52 CH.-KENT L. REv. 525, 530-38 (1975), and cases
cited therein.
32. See id. at 537, and authorities cited therein.
33. See Liebman, supra note 2, at 1001; Note, supra note 22, at 920-21, and authorities cited
therein.
34. W. E. Bassett Co. v. H. C. Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821 (D. Conn. 1961), a 'dper curiam,
302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962). See also Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Cannons of
Ethics and Intra-Firm Conflicts of Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058, 1062-63 (1964). The appearance of
impropriety consideration has also given rise to some strong judicial language requiring disqualifi-
cation: "[A]n attorney may be required to withdraw from a case where there exists even an ap-
pearance of a conflict of interest," Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 709 (7th Cir.
1976); "[1]n the disqualification situation, any doubt is to be resolved in favor of disqualification,"
Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975). The court further noted
The preservation of public trust both in the scrupulous administration ofjustice and in
the ihtegrity of the b ar is paramount. Recognizably important are [plaintiffs] right to
counsel of her choice and the consideration of ... judicial economy .... These con-
siderations must yield, however, to considerations of ethics which run to the very integ-
rity of our judicial process.
Id. at 572. The conflict of interest in this latter case was dramatic. Plaintiff's lawyer sought to
represent as intervening plaintiff one of defendant's in-house lawyers, who had been active in the
defense of the case before the court (involving sex discrimination). There was evidence of actual
transmission of confidential information. Therefore the "appearance of impropriety" approach
was adopted more out of an abundance of judicial caution than out of necessity.
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tation in a given case may give rise to an 'appearance of impropriety' is
not enough to disqualify. Specific facts must point to a marked danger
that the perceived evil. . . will result. ' 35 Likewise, the Second Circuit
held that "when there is no claim that the trial will be tainted, appear-
ance of impropriety is simply too slender a reed on which to rest a
disqualification order except in the rarest cases."' 36 The Silver Chrysler
district court maintained that hasty disqualification solely on the basis
of appearance of impropriety charges will itself tend to undermine the
confidence in the legal system that Canon Nine is intended to foster.37
It would be easy to overstate both the "Watergate" trend towards
increasing reliance on Canon Nine and the more recent trend in the
other direction.38 There has undoubtedly been a greater change in lan-
guage than in the way cases will be decided. It does seem, however,
that courts are now doctrinally prepared to deny tactical disqualifica-
tion motions that are based only on a speculative assertion of the ap-
pearance of impropriety.
D. Conclusions on the Law of Disqualification.
For purposes of a discussion of the ethics of moving to disqualify
opposing counsel, a key question is how often a motion will result in a
disqualification when thete should have been none. It is clear that a
technical Code violation will no longer invariably result in disqualifica-
tion.39 Courts have become sensitive to the tactical abuse of motions to
disqualify. As the Fifth Circuit has observed, "[i]nasmuch as attempts
to disqualify opposing counsel are becoming increasingly frequent, we
cannot permit Canon 9 to be manipulated for strategic advantage on
the account of an impropriety which exists only in the minds of imagi-
native lawyers."' 4° In a dramatic recent development, a district court
went so far as to require that moving attorneys pay lawyer's fees under
35. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 722, 724
(E.D.N.Y. 1979).
36. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979).
37. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 589
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
38. It has been suggested that Silver Chrysler, which expressed a concern to avoid an "excess
of ethical fervor," 370 F. Supp. at 591, in disqualifying in terms of Canon Nine, stood in isolated
opposition to the trend toward more aggressive application of the Canon. Note, supra note 31, at
536-37. From the vantage point of 1979, it appears more accurate to say that Silver Chrysler was
the beginning of a continuing trend limiting the doctrine that a mere appearance of impropriety is
sufficient to disqualify an attorney in a prior representation case.
39. Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 991 (8th Cir.
1978).
40. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 819 (5th Cir. 1976). See also OPINIONS
No. 342, at 4-5 (1975).
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28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976)4 1 when it found their disqualification motion
to be "patently frivolous," and intended to "harass" and "delay." 42
Unjustified disqualifications will surely continue. Nevertheless, there is
reason to believe that their number will be held down by increasing
judicial reluctance to disqualify when the conflict of interest is margi-
nal and the movant's motivation is tactical.
II. THE ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The ethically difficult decision of whether or not to move to dis-
qualify opposing counsel arises when there is a very small probability
of significant harm or a significant probability of a very small harm to
one's client if opposing counsel is not disqualified. In these cases the
movant has a small "expected utility"43 gain in making the motion.
Typically, the cost for the adverse party will be considerably greater in
terms of choice of counsel and the necessity for repetition of at least
some of counsel's preparatory labors.44 The hard cases, then, are those
in which the motion to disqualify is not totally frivolous, but the benefit
it will yield by removing the conflict of interest is small relative to the
harm it inflicts upon the adverse party apart from the loss of any con-
flict of interest advantage. In short, the hard case is one in which, from
a neutral viewpoint, there should be no disqualification but in which
disqualification would modestly serve the interest of one's client.
A. The Obligation to Move to Disqualify.
One appealingly simple solution to the ethical problem is to say
that one has a duty to move to disqualify opposing counsel whenever
there is a nontrivial possibility of a conflict of interest. The existence of
such a duty may arise from DR 1-103(A): "A lawyer possessing un-
privileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102 shall report such
knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or
act upon such violation. '45 DR 1-102 is violated whenever there is a
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976) provides: "Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct
cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings
in any case as to increase costs unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to
satisfy personally such excess costs."
42. North Am. Foreign Trading Corp. v. Zale Corp., 83 F.R.D. 293, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
43. Expected utility equals utility multipled by the probability of that utility's being realized.
44. Some or all of the disqualified attorney's work product may be judicially denied to the
new counsel for fear of transmission of tainted information. First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First
Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1978).
45. Some states in adopting DR 1-103(A) changed "shall" to "should"--apparently to
weaken the obligation. Others have deleted DR 1-103(A). See Note, The Lawyer's Duty to Report
Professional Misconduct, 20 ARIZ. L. REv. 509, 511 (1979).
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violation of any other disciplinary rule.46 A conflict of interest of the
type considered by this Comment will presumably violate either DR 4-
101(B) 47 or DR 5-105,48 at least as interpreted in the light of Canon
Nine.49
There is an argument, then, that the Code requires that any possi-
ble conflict of interest be reported to the court in some fashion. Courts
have recognized the existence of such an obligation. The Fifth Circuit,
for example, has held that "[w]hen an attorney discovers a possible eth-
ical violation concerning a matter before a court, he is not only author-
ized but is in fact obligated to bring the problem to that court's
attention. ' 50 A district court has also asserted that the proper way to
bring opposing counsel's conflict of interest to the court's attention is by
a motion to disqualify.51 If these two claims are correct, the ethical
problem is solved with the addition of one further premise: one is obli-
gated to do what the Code commands.
The first point at which this argument is vulnerable is its interpre-
tation of the Code. It seems clear enough that the Code does assert that
there is an obligation to inform the relevant tribunal whenever one
knows that there is a conflict of interest. What if one only suspects that
there may be a conflict or believes that a conflict will probably develop
in the future?
An Informal Opinion of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Pro-
fessional Responsibility is relevant to this question. The inquiry to the
Committee concerned the propriety of moving to disqualify the firm of
an opposing attorney A who would probably be required to testify in a
contract action. The Committee concluded, "you do have a right, al-
though not necessarily an obligation, to attempt to disqualify the...
46. DR 1-102(A)(1) provides: "A lawyer shall not: Violate a Disciplinary Rule."
47. For the text of DR 4-101(B), see note 9 supra.
48. DR 5-105 provides in pertinent part:
Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interest of Another Client May Im-
pair the Independent Professional Judgment of the Lawyer.
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by
the acceptance of the proferred employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in
representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment
under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with
him or his firm, may accept or continue such employment.
49. See generally Note, supra note 31.
50. In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 1976). See also In re Grand Jury, 446 F.
Supp. 1132 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 345 F. Supp. 93,
98 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
51. E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 376 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
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firm."' 52 The Committee prefaced this conclusion with the somewhat
puzzling explanation that "[w]hether or not A and his firm should be
disqualified from representing the defendant in the litigation if A testi-
fies is a matter to be decided by the court before whom the case is
pending. We, accordingly do not think that the provisions of DR 1-102
and DR 1-103 are applicable. 53
It is possible, but unlikely, that the Committee intended to say that
there is never a duty to move to disqualify--since whether or not coun-
sel should be disqualified is ultimately "a matter to be decided by the
court before whom the case is pending. 5 4 More likely, the Committee
felt that in the case of a witness-counsel problem, the court will auto-
matically become aware of the conflict at the time it becomes an actual
conflict. When a report would at most apprise the court of the conflict
sooner, the report may be ethically optional.
In any event, it seems safe to reach the following conclusions from
the Code and Informal Opinion No. 1379. First, the Code does recog-
nize a right to move to disqualify opposing counsel when there is a
nontrivial possibility of conflict of interest. Second, there is a duty to
inform the court in some manner when one knows that there is a con-
flict of which the court might not otherwise learn. Third, there is prob-
ably a duty to inform the court when one believes that there is or may
develop a conflict about which the court might not otherwise learn.
Having determined that there is sometimes a duty to inform the
court of a possible conflict of interest, the question remains whether the
filing of a motion to disqualify opposing counsel is the only proper way
to convey this information. Surely the answer is in the negative. Chan-
nels of communications with the court are not so limited. A conscien-
tious attorney who is eager to move the proceedings along quickly will
inform the court of a conflict of interest and waive objection to it.55 So,
despite some ill-considered judicial language,56 such a motion is at
most a proper way to inform the court of a conflict of interest, not the
proper way.
Thus, while DR 1-103 does not establish a duty to move to dis-
qualify opposing counsel, the Code does recognize such a motion as
ethically permissible. Is the Code correct about this? Is there always a
52. INFORMAL OPINIONS, supra note 15, No. 1379, at 3 (1976).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. The court can disqualify counsel sua sponte despite the waiver if it views the conflict as
sufficiently serious. See Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1057, 1059-60 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
56. E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 376 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
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right to move to disqualify when the motion would be nonfrivolous?
One thing is clear: the Code would subject no lawyer to discipline for
so moving. No Disciplinary Rule would be violated-at least not if the
rules are enforced as the Committee on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility seems to understand them. That would settle the question
for a "legal realist" for whom "X is ethical" means "no one will be
disciplined for doing X." This is not, however, the position of the
Code, which recognizes ethical ideals, typified by the "Ethical Consid-
erations," as well as the minimum requirements of the Disciplinary
Rules. In some cases motions to disqualify may be permissible under
the Disciplinary Rules but impermissible in the more full-bodied ethics
of an ethically sensitive practitioner.
In fact, even if the Disciplinary Rules announced a duty to move
to disqualify in the "hard cases," it might, nonetheless, be impermissi-
ble to file the motion. It is quite conceivable that the Code is inconsis-
tent with legal ethics at a given point, despite the authoritative bodies
that stand behind the Code.57 The drafters of any sort of code will
sometimes make mistakes. Cases arise that were unforeseen. When the
Disciplinary Rules require conduct that seems clearly unethical to most
practitioners, then the Rules simply do not constitute the content of
legal ethics on that point. To think otherwise is to take a formalistic
approach that is hopelessly removed from legal ethics as it actually
functions within the practice of law. DR 1-103, then, however it may
be interpreted, cannot by itself settle the ethical status of motions to
disqualify opposing counsel in those cases in which the expected injury
from the conflict of interest is small relative to the hardship disqualifi-
cation will cause the opposing party.
B. Nonrelational Ethics.
Traditional philosophical theories of ethics contain a fundamental
premise that every human being is of equal moral dignity. From this it
follows that what is morally permissible (or obligatory) to do to A is
morally permissible (or obligatory) to do to B, unless there is some
morally relevant difference between A and B. The basic premise may
be illustrated by looking to its consequences for particular normative
ethical theories. In the utilitarian calculus for maximizing total human
happiness, for example, the happiness of any person counts as much as
57. Drafted by the A.B.A. Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethics Standards, the Code
and its amendments have been adopted by the House of Delegates of the A.B.A. See CODE i-ii. It
has also been adopted by the legislature or the court system of every state except California. The
Code's continuing authority is called into question by the existence of a committee to draft a new
Code.
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that of any other person in determining what is morally required.
Thus, if the thousand dollars in A's bank account would produce more
happiness if sent to a starving family in an underdeveloped country, A
will be morally obligated to send it off, other things being equal.
At the greatest level of abstraction, a utilitarian would think it
morally impermissible to move to disqualify in the ethically "hard"
cases. In these cases theharm done the adverse party will, by hypothe-
sis, outweigh the benefit to one's client. It is immaterial from the utili-
tarian perspective who bears the injuries. The point is to minimize
them. Utilitarians, however, like other traditional moral theorists, rec-
ognize exceptions to the rule that everyone is to be treated in the same
way. There are morally relevant differences among people. For exam-
ple, if A makes a promise to B but not to C, A will have obligations to
B that A does not have to C.58
A moral philosophy denying that such relations as parent-child,
promisor-promisee, or lawyer-client ever make a moral difference can
be called a "nonrelational" ethics. Such an ethics, in its full generality,
is extremely radical, and has probably never been espoused by any-
one.5 9 For the purposes of this Comment, all that must be considered is
the possiblity of "nonrelational" legal ethics, in that they deny that the
relation between lawyer and client creates an ethical reason for the law-
yer to prefer the client's interest to that of the adverse party.
Nonrelational legal ethics, in this sense, provide an easy answer to
the "hard cases." One is not permitted to move to disqualify. This
system not only provides an easy and unambiguous answer, but it is an
answer with a certain intuitive appeal. After all, one's clients are no
better than anyone else-or if they are it is by accident. Why should
they be accorded a special place in the moral universe? The answer is
that clients do not have a special place in the moral universe, but they
do in the moral universe of their attorney. They have a special place
because the attorney has undertaken to create a special relationship
with them. That this relationship makes a difference within legal ethics
has systematic as well as intuitive support. Just as the institution of
promising could not exist unless promisees were sometimes treated dif-
ferently from the rest of humanity, the institution of legal representa-
tion could not exist unless clients were sometimes treated differently
from nonclients. Legal ethics is not and could not be simultaneously
nonrelational and appropriate to any legal system remotely resembling
58. For the utilitarian these obligations arise because the institution of promising is useful. It
tends to lead to greater happiness by enabling people to coordinate their affairs.
59. For a philosophy of legal ethics influenced by a form of non-relationalism, see Wasser-
strom, Lawyers as Professionals.- Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1975).
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ours. Under strictly nonrelational legal ethics, the lawyer would be
under no more duty to write a brief for the client than for the adverse
party. For these reasons, strictly nonrelational ethics are implausible,
and it would be unwise to turn to them for help in determining the
legal ethics of moving to disqualify opposing counsel for conflict of
interest.
C. Strongly Client-Centered Ethics.
Since nonrelational legal ethics are so clearly wrong, the opposite
hypothesis comes to mind: perhaps the lawyer must favor the client's
interest above the interest of all nonclients under all circumstances-
however small the benefit to the client and however great the harm to
the nonclient. The classic statement of the position is Lord
Brougham's:
Every one knows that the ties between advocate and client are of the
most sacred nature. It is the duty of an advocate to save his client by
all expedient means, to protect him at all hazards, and to the injury
of all others, and of himself among those others, if it be necessary.
He must not hesitate at the pain he may inflict, or at the destruction
he may cause in the prosecution of that duty.60
Strongly client-centered ethics provide that a lawful action that
benefits the client more than any alternative action is ethically obliga-
tory. Such ethics provide an answer to the "hard questions" of moving
to disqualify opposing counsel as easily as do nonrelational ethics. But
the answer is, of course, just the opposite. Strongly client-centered eth-
ics require that the motion be made.
Just as there is most probably no one who argues for a nonrela-
tional legal ethics, there may be no one who goes to the limit with a
strongly client-centered ethics.61 But in the case of client-centered eth-
60. 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 5-6 (1821).
61. DR 7-101 requires client-centered conduct subject to some broad exceptions:
(A) A lawyer shall not intentionally:
(1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably avail-
able means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules, except as pro-
vided by DR 7-101(B). A lawyer does not violate this Disciplinary Rule,
however, by ... avoiding offensive tactics ....
(B) In his representation of a client, a lawyer may:
(1) Where permissible, exercise his professional judgment to waive or fail to
assert a right or position of his client.
(2) Refuse to aid or participate in conduct that he believes to be unlawful,
even though there is some support for an argument that the conduct is
legal.
The Disciplinary Rules exception of DR 7-101(A)(l) presumably covers frivolous disqualifi-
cation motions since conduct that would "serve merely to harass or maliciously injur another" is
forbidden by DR 7-102(A)(l).
The "avoiding offensive tactics" language of DR 7-10l(A)(l) or, possibly, the "professional
judgment" language of DR 7-101(B)(1) arguably except the ethically harder disqualification cases
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ics there are both practitioners and academic theorists who are very
close to the full position.62 For this reason the position deserves close
attention.
1. The Conventional Justfication. The justification almost uni-
versally given by the proponents of strongly client-centered ethics is
that the internal logic of the adversary system requires such ethics.63
For this justification of strongly client-centered ethics to succeed, three
propositions must be true: (1) the adversary system promotes impor-
tant values; (2) those values are not as effectively promoted by any legal
ethics other than strongly client-centered ethics; and (3) the values pro-
moted by the adversary system take precedence over all competing val-
ues.
The first proposition is easily granted. Historical experience sug-
gests that the adversary system is a good means for promoting justice64
and the acceptance of the legal system. It provides a fairly effective
way of uncovering factual truth, subject to certain limits, and of ascer-
taining and developing the law. When functioning properly it provides
the parties with the psychological assurance that their interests are
taken seriously and are given every chance to prevail, compatible with
providing the same chance to the other side. By taking the parties and
their cases seriously, the system recognizes and promotes a sense of the
fundamental dignity of the person. If there are better means of accom-
plishing these ends, they remain to be demonstrated.
The second proposition, that strongly client-centered ethics maxi-
mize the values of the adversary system, is more controversial.
Strongly client-centered ethics do strengthen the psychological effects
of the system by encouraging the parties to feel that their interests are
being taken seriously. They permit the strongest possible identification
of client with lawyer because they place the fewest limits on the law-
yer's loyalty to the client's position. On the other hand, a well-known
problem is that client-centered ethics pursued to their limits may pro-
mote less, not more, truth,65 thus inhibiting justice. Strongly client-cen-
from the scope of DR 7-101(A)'s obligation exclusively to pursue the client's interests. Moreover,
the Code taken in its entirety certainly does not suggest an exclusively client-centered ethics.
Strongly client-centered ethics are not simply zealous in pursuing the client's interest. They are
hyperzealous in permitting the pursuit if nothing else. Since this is contrary to the spirit of the
Code, its justification must be sought elsewhere.
62. See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975).
63. Id. 2-10.
64. For a general discussion of the justice related values asserted to be associated with the
adversary system, see Golding, On the Adversary System and Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL LAW 98
(R. Bronaugh ed. 1978).
65. Strong attacks on the adversary system as a truth producer are found in J. FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL (1963) and Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L.
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tered ethics sometimes require the presentation of known perjury,66 the
nondisclosure of relevant facts or law, and the making of dilatory mo-
tions, all practices inimical to the production of truth. Even the ap-
pearance of justice may be undermined, for while most clients feel that
client-centered ethics on the part of their lawyer produce justice, they
are likely to have very different feelings about client-centered conduct
on the part of the opposing counsel.67 Thus, strongly client-centered
ethics increase the belief that the outcome of litigation is controlled by
the manipulation of technicalities rather than the merits. It is, there-
fore, by no means clear that such ethics are maximally effective in pro-
moting the values that the adversary system is designed to secure.
Harder still to grant is the third proposition, that the values associ-
ated with the adversary system take precedence over all competing val-
ues. Justice and the perception of justice in the resolution of legal
disputes are surely important, but so are many other values. We
would, for example, presumably be unwilling to buy a small increase in
justice if the price were a tripling of the size and expense of the legal
system. To take a second example, it is at least not an obvious viola-
tion of the values that the adversary system is supposed to promote to
inject a nonparty witness with a truth serum. This practice might well
be productive of truth, justice, and the assurance that one's case will be
taken seriously. Presumably, however, it must nonetheless be ruled out
as an impermissible invasion of the person of the witness.
Legal ethics must be congruent with values arising outside the ad-
versary system.68 The adversary system, therefore, does not supply the
REV. 1031 (1975). Criticisms of Frankel's proposals for reform include Freedman, Judge Frankel's
Searchfor Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060 (1975), and Uviller, The 4dvocate, the Truth, and
Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1067 (1975).
66. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 62, at 27-42. See also Pye, The Role of Counsel in the Suppres-
slon 0/Truth, 1978 DUKE L.J. 921, and authorities collected therein at 924 n.17.
67. This aspect of the problem is obscured when the context of discussion is criminal justice.
Hyperzealous prosecution is obviously imcompatible with our criminal justice traditions and val-
ues. Thus proponents of strongly client-centered ethics recommend the system only for the de-
fense. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 62. One-sided hyperzealous criminal jurisprudence may be
justified by the importance of keeping the innocent from being punished and of counterbalancing
the actual and perceived power disparity between the state and the individual. No doubt some
sacrifice in truth and justice is a price worth paying to minimize the punishment of the innocent
and to protect the human dignity of the accused; but there is a countervailing consideration in the
perception of injustice by the prosecutor's "clients," the public.
68. Just as the fundamental question of philosophical jurisprudence is the relation of the law
to morality, so the fundamental question of the jurisprudence of legal ethics is the relation of that
ethics to the wider morality.
A legal ethics in radical conflict with the values of general morality would presumably not be
a correct legal ethics. Positivism is a less plausible hypothesis with respect to legal ethics than it is
with respect to law. But the extent to which general values must infuse legal ethics is far from
clear. Not every conflict between the two systems of values is necessarily fatal. The lawyer can
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axioms from which all questions of legal ethics may be deduced. Even
if the adversary system would be best promoted by client-centered eth-
ics, the correctness of these ethics could not be inferred.
2. An Alternative Justocation. It is not hard to demonstrate the
inadequacy of the standard argument for client-centered ethics. There
is, however, a second argument for client-centered ethics that has re-
ceived little theoretical attention, though it is closely related to the rea-
son many practitioners are client-centered in their ethical practice. The
key premise of this second argument is that a correct system of legal
ethics must prescribe standards that the legal profession is capable of
meeting. That "ought" entails "can" is philosophically uncontrover-
sial. What is controversial is how the "can" is to be analyzed. A cor-
rect ethical system obviously will not require what is logically 69 or
physically impossible.70 But it is arguable, as well, that a correct ethical
system will not impose obligations that people are incapable of carry-
ing out due to deep-seated psychological incapacity. 7' Many systems of
general ethics recognize this limitation by making a distinction between
two kinds of good actions. An action that is the best action that could
be performed in the situation is obligatory only if it is of a sort that
morally trained but ordinary people could be counted on to perform in
those circumstances a reasonable percentage of the time. On the other
hand, if the best action under the circumstances is of a sort that only
saints or moral heroes could be expected to perform, then it is said to
be "supererogatory." To perform the action is commendable but not
obligatory.72 An example of an action widely regarded as supereroga-
always step outside of his or her role as defined by legal ethics in response to "higher" moral
concerns. By not requiring a complete correspondence between legal ethics and general morality,
it may be possible to make legal ethics simpler, more systematically unified, and thus easier to
learn and employ in common situations.
69. An example of a logically impossible action is the construction of the diagonals of a
circle.
70. An example of a physically impossible action is jumping across the Mississippi River at
St. Louis.
71. A "deep-seated psychological incapacity" for these purposes is one that could not be
overcome by reasonable levels of moral instruction within a period of several years. The causes of
such incapacities may lie in genetic structure, but they may also be social in origin, involving such
matters as the demands of competition and peer pressure.
72. The distinction between what is obligatory or mandatory and what is commendable is
made within ethical systems. It is not a distinction dividing law from ethics. While ethical and
legal obligations differ, obligation is not foreign to ethics. To claim, as does Dean Patterson, that
"ethical rules are only commendatory in nature, whereas legal rules are mandatory," Patterson, 4
Preliminary Rationalization of the Law of LegalEthics, 57 N.C.L. REv. 519, 519 (1979), is to con-
fuse being "only commendatory" with the absence of official sanctions. That one may not murder
another is morally as well as legally obligatory. We do not commend one another for not having
committed murder yesterday.
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tory is risking one's life to save a stranger.
An ethical system that fails to make this distinction, and makes all
best actions obligatory, is probably too difficult for most people to live
up to, as is Utilitarianism if it requires the average American to send
most of his or her wealth to underdeveloped countries. Since its pre-
scriptions will be violated, there will be a divergence between ethical
theory and practice, which may widen into a disrespect for the ethical
system as a whole. This disrespect, in turn, is likely to lead to a general
breakdown of the system, including those aspects that people would
have followed under other circumstances.
There is a plausible argument, then, that any ethical system that is
too rigorous cannot be a correct ethical system.73 Ethics is an institu-
tion whose purpose is to guide human conduct. Any system incapable
of so doing fails the threshold requirement. If this argument is correct,
then the set of candidate ethics can be described as "psychologically
constrained." What the ethics can demand is limited by what the target
population can be expected to follow.
On the other hand, it is not inconceivable that there is a single
correct system of general ethics whose truth is quite independent of
matters of moral psychology. To suppose that truth is in part a func-
tion of our psychological weaknesses does not give the moral law the
transcendent status many traditional theorists have ascribed to it.74 On
these accounts, if we are incapable of living up to the dictates of the
moral law, so much the worse for us!
Fortunately, it is not necessary, for the purposes of this Comment,
to investigate the question of psychological constraint within the con-
text of general ethical theory. The issue can be restricted to the setting
of professional ethics, and within that setting the plausibility of psycho-
logically constrained ethics is especially great. Professional ethics are
practical, working ethics. There is nothing to be gained in having pro-
fessional ethics that are too difficult to be adhered to. The losses are
inevitable and obvious: cynicism, disillusionment, hypocrisy, and ill
feeling toward the profession on the part of the rest of the population.
These are reasons to believe that professional ethics ought to be psy-
chologically constrained even if general ethics is not. If members of
society, lawyers and laypersons, were in a position to choose whether
legal ethics should be psychologically constrained or not, the desire that
the system be effective would presumably dictate that the choice be
made in favor of psychological constraint. That society would so
73. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE i76-78 (1971).
74. Plato and Kant are representatives of this tradition.
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choose is at least good evidence that a correct legal ethics must be psy-
chologically constrained.75
Having concluded that the system must include psychological con-
straints, the next task is to ascertain the breadth of the constraints. At
one extreme, it might be suggested that lawyers can, as an empirical
matter, follow no ethics but that of self-interest. That would, however,
amount to following no ethics at all. Such a situation would not neces-
sarily mean that law as a profession would deteriorate in the way it
relates to the rest of the world. Enlightened long-term self-interest can
sometimes produce remarkably civil conduct. But it would, under
these circumstances, be better to let the notion of legal ethics fade into
history.
It is a plausible hypothesis that in the present state of society law-
yers are, for the most part, able to live up to the demands of a client-
centered ethics, but are generally unable to live up to an ethics that
occasionally requires that the interests of nonclients be preferred to
those of clients.
In contrast to an ethics of self-interest, client-centered ethics have
a distinct content, for client-centered ethics prohibit a good deal of con-
duct that is at least in the short-run interest of the attorney. This is
particularly true in motion practice, where dilatory motions may in-
crease fees without advancing the interest of the client. Client-centered
ethics forbids this practice, and in so doing demonstrates that it is suffi-
ciently distinguishable from simple self-interest to warrant the name
"ethics."
There are significant advantages that would be derived from the
profession's embracing officially and publicly the client-centered solu-
tions to the hard questions of motions to disqualify opposing counsel.
Ethical norms would not be distant from actual practice. Ethical law-
yers would be at no competitive disadvantage against their less scrupu-
lous fellows. Hypocrisy would be minimized. Of course, this solution
requires that the problems of unjustified disqualification and of mo-
tions intended to harass the opposing party be dealt with in some way
other than by imposing an obligation on the lawyer to consider the
interests of the adverse party before moving to disqualify opposing
counsel. Statutory or judicial restriction detailing when disqualifica-
tion can be granted is an obvious means for dealing with the first prob-
75. Just what is shown by thought experiments in which subject populations make rational
choices among alternative ethical principles is open to debate. Minimally, the principles that
would be chosen have a prima facie claim to being correct-assuming a proper construction of the
experiments. For the most ambitious and well-developed use of this method, see J. RAWLS, supra
note 73.
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lem. If disqualification is restricted to those cases in which it is
genuinely necessary to insure justice, the problem of questionable dis-
qualification motions would presumably recede without requiring any
special ethical self-policing by attorneys. A further advantage would
be superior protection for the parties. That such narrowing is already
underway is suggested by judicial relaxation of the artificial vicarious
disqualification rules and judicial unwillingness to accept strained "ap-
pearance of impropriety" reasoning.76 A judge is in a much better po-
sition to watch out for the interest of a party than is opposing counsel.
The problem of harassment and delay by motions that are not ex-
pected to succeed could be dealt with by a system of penalties. 77 Delay
could also be prevented by eliminating direct appeals from orders de-
nying disqualification of counsel.7 8
In short, there are ways of dealing with the undesirable effects of
client-centered ethics other than modifying the ethics. The public im-
age of a lawyer, willing to make use of any technical device to the ad-
vantage of his or her client, is not such an unattractive one if the
profession structures the technical devices available so that their utili-
zation does not produce serious injustice.
D. Restricted Client-Centered Ethics.
While client-centered ethics may be structured to provide a passa-
ble solution to the problems connected with motions to disqualify op-
posing counsel, there are alternatives that are more desirable. Two of
these more desirable alternatives will be discussed here. Both represent
modifications of the strictly client-centered approach, and both make
use of the same general decisionmaking procedure. Under the first al-
ternative, the main step of the procedure is commendable but not obli-
gatory, while under the second alternative the entire procedure is
obligatory. Examination of the differences between the two alterna-
tives and the grounds for preferring one to the other is best postponed
until after a discussion of their shared general procedure.
76. See notes 19-40 supra and accompanying text.
77. DR 7-102(A)(1) arguably already provides a basis for such sanctions. Strictly speaking,
the penalties would have to be assessed against the client were they to function within a pure
client-centered ethics. However, it is not extravagant cynicism to believe that penalties assessed
against the attorney personally would be an effective deterrent even for fairly consistent client-
centered attorneys. Probably the best way to conceptualize such penalties is to think of them as
building a small exception into client-centered ethics. The exception, enforced by direct judicial
sanctions against the attorney, runs in favor of the adverse party and prohibits filing a meritless
motion. The court in one recent case has assessed attorney's fees, expenses, and costs against the
moving attorney. See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text.
78. Melamed v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290, 295 (6th Cir. 1979).
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1. The Decision Procedure. There are two threshold matters.
First, it is impermissible to move for disqualification when one knows
that there is no conflict of interest or only a benign technical conflict.
This much, though potentially incompatible with strongly client-cen-
tered ethics, seems a minimum requirement of fundamental honesty
and is surely embraced by the lawyer's status as an officer of the court.
Second, and for the same reasons, if there is a nontrivial possibility that
there is a genuine conflict of interest of which the court might otherwise
be unaware, there is a duty to inform the court, though not necessarily
by filing a motion to disqualify.7 9 The admonitions of the Code80 and
the courts to report conflicts of interest reinforce this duty.
8t
With these threshold requirements in mind, we may address the
substance of the proposed decision procedure. Whether there is a duty
to move for disqualification will depend primarily upon a weighing of
the advantage to the client in making the motion against the disadvan-
tage tothe adverse party.82 The attorney should not make the motion if
the client's advantage in eliminating the adverse party's conflict of in-
terest is very small relative to the adverse party's loss due to factors
other than the loss of the conflict of interest advantage.
The weighing process should then be fine tuned by taking into ac-
count factors that militate against filing the motion. The relevant fac-
tors are whether the adverse party is deprived of constitutional or other
fundamental rights; whether the conflict of interest will appear to the
public to be merely technical; whether the disqualification would cause
inefficiencies and dislocations in the provision of legal services by forc-
ing firms to adopt an overly cautious attitude toward potential conflicts
of interest; and whether the behavior of the opposing party in the
course of the litigation has been free from technical manipulations and
dirty tricks.83
79. See text accompanying notes 45-56 supra. Note that this obligation to inform may also
run counter to client-centered ethics. Either because of considerations of time or because one
believes opposing counsel to be less than the best available, one may not want opposing counsel
disqualified even though there is a genuine conflict of interest. Under such circumstances it is in
the client's interest that information not reach the bench on the basis of which the judge might
disqualify opposing counsel sua sponte.
80. DR 1-103. See notes 45-49 supra and accompanying text.
81. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
82. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
83. The bad behavior of opponents is sometimes cited by practitioners as a reason for ethical
corner cutting. The danger in such arguments is that they encourage a feedback phenomenon and
a steady decline of ethical standards in practice. It is probably neither possible nor desirable to
eliminate the intuition that those who exhibit good behavior deserve better than those who do not.
The correct solutions would seem to be that all opponents receive a floor level of ethical consider-
ation--however far their own behavior falls below that floor-while those who exhibit standards
above the floor be dealt with on at least their own level.
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2. The Procedure as Nonobligatory Ideal. In the first proposed
solution to the problem of when to move to disqualify, only the two
threshold matters are obligatory. The weighing of interests, the heart
of the procedure, is prescribed as an ideal. The ethically robust practi-
tioner will follow it, but it is not obligatory. In this respect the first
solution parallels the Code's distinction between Ethical Considera-
tions and Disciplinary Rules. The threshold principles, like the Disci-
plinary Rules, are obligatory, and it would be appropriate for them to
be enforced through disciplinary action. The use of the weighing pro-
cedure, on the other hand, is not appropriately enforceable. It would,
however, be recommended and praiseworthy, or, as the Code says of
the Ethical Considerations, "aspirational in character . . .[represent-
ing] the objectives toward which every member of the profession
should strive. '"8 4
This solution is superior to strictly client-centered ethics in requir-
ing the threshold steps. These steps are essential to a proper operation
of the system, even if nearly all the responsibility for avoiding unjusti-
fied disqualifications rests with the court. They further the values of
the adversary system, and it is unlikely that making them obligatory
would be too demanding from the point of view of moral psychology.
The second step, reporting a conflict, will only rarely be contrary to the
movant's interest, while the first, refraining from moving to disqualify
in very weak cases, usually involves, at most, giving up a temporary
delay and harassment device whose long-run tactical advantageousness
is open to serious doubt. These threshold steps then, while desirable,
represent such a small departure from strictly client-centered ethics that
the problem of overrigorousness presumably cannot arise.
The more important stage of the procedure, the weighing of the
client's interest against those of the opposing party, is only recom-
mended. This recommendation is, however, a departure from the strict
client-centered system, since it asserts the desirability of looking to
other interests in addition to the client's. In establishing only an ideal,
rather than an obligation, however, it avoids the problem of excessive
rigorousness. Moral psychology casts doubt on a nonobligatory ideal
only when the ideal is so elevated that no one could be expected to live
up to it, even in part, in any circumstances. The weighing procedure
clearly does not represent such an unapproachable ideal.
For these reasons, the first solution to the issue of moving to dis-
qualify opposing counsel can be expected to work, even given the truth
of the key empirical hypothesis supporting the moral psychological ar-
84. CODE Preliminary Statement.
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gument for client-centered ethics-the hypothesis that an obligation to
take the nonclient's interest into account would be too demanding for
the great majority of lawyers. Moreover, the solution is more attractive
than the strictly client-centered theory in permitting interests other than
the client's to be taken into account when they are especially pressing.
There seems to be no reason, then, not to prefer this solution to that
offered by strictly client-centered ethics.
It is possible, however, that the empirical hypothesis that supports
the moral psychological argument for client-centered ethics is false,
and that a significant proportion of lawyers are capable of taking the
interests of the adverse party and opposing counsel into account in de-
ciding whether to move to disqualify opposing counsel. If this is true, a
second solution is to be preferred over the one just discussed-a solu-
tion that departs a little further from strictly client-centered ethics.
3. The Procedure as Obligatory. To make the weighing proce-
dure itself obligatory, as well as the threshold steps, is to require utiliza-
tion of both the initial balancing and the secondary fine-tuning
procedure. To make this procedure obligatory is to assert not only that
it is a good thing to take nonclient interests into account, but that not to
do so is an ethical failing for which censure is appropriate. Discipli-
nary measures stronger than informal private censure could be applied,
though they need not be.
This solution is superior to its less demanding brother if the key
empirical hypothesis is false, and a significant number of lawyers are
able to depart from client-centered behavior by engaging in the weigh-
ing procedure. It is likely that lawyers are capable of rising above cli-
ent-centered behavior to this degree, since the weighing procedure is
not itself a very dramatic departure from client-centered conduct. It
does not call for an equal weighing of the interests of client and non-
client. Rather, it prefers the interest of the client unless the interest of
the nonclient is disproprotionately greater, as, for example, when the
adverse party's interest is a matter of constitutional or other fundamen-
tal rights, and the client's is not.
There are two reasons for the narrowness of thle departure from
the client-centered system. First, while the "adversary-system argu-
ment" for client-centered ethics is unsuccessful, 85 it is not wholly mis-
guided. The adversary system does protect important values, and there
is a close relationship between the adversary system and those ethics
that make the interests of the client central. Too great a departure from
85. See text accompanying notes 63-68 supra.
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client-centeredness would be incompatible with the efficient function-
ing of that system, and even if replacements of equal or greater value
are possible, they are unlikely to be arrived at short of a careful and
exhaustive rethinking of the entire system of justice. To render the ad-
versary system less adversary in small ways when it collides with other
important values is not to scrap it altogether. To make it less adversary
in larger ways might well be.
Second, even if the major hypothesis of the moral psychology ar-
gument is false, and a significant number of lawyers would not find it
too demanding to give nonclient interests priority under certain cir-
cumstances, still, experience suggests that the hypothesis is not too far
off base. Overextension of the circumstances under which the attorney
must give priority to the interests of noncients would thus render the
ethical demands too rigorous for the overwhelming majority of practi-
tioners, and the ethics would cease to guide conduct effectively. While
the proposed solution does not depart too far from client-centered eth-
ics, recommendations of the two systems will sometimes diverge.
Under the system proposed here, for example, the lawyer might be re-
quired to refuse his or her client's request to disqualify opposing coun-
sel.
It is worth pausing to consider how the attorney would justify this
refusal to the client. No doubt it would help a great deal if the attorney
could point to a requirement in a code of legal ethics. If the provision
were backed by disciplinary sanctions, that might satisfy the client.
The client, however, might well wonder how the code provision itself is
to be justified. So, to isolate the real justification problem, let us imag-
ine an attorney who seeks to justify refusing a client's request in the
absence of a disciplinary rule.
The lawyer might first cite the disproportionate injury to the ad-
verse party. This is, in fact, the heart of the matter, ethically speaking.
The lawyer, however, may anticipate that some clients, having little
charity in their hearts for the opposing party, will be quite unmoved by
this consideration. An argument in terms of the institutional effects of
the ethical requirement will probably be more persuasive. The attor-
ney could explain that the proliferation of disqualification motions
tends to produce delay and to tie up legal resources, thus increasing the
expense while perhaps lowering the quality of legal services. Such dis-
locations in the legal system obviously run counter to the long-run in-
terest of clients-including the present client.
The astute client might conclude that client-centered ethics justi-
fies the refusal to move to disqualify after all. The purported novelty of
the "restricted client-centered" proposal is merely that it emphasizes
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the client's long-run interest as a consumer of legal services rather than
his or her short-run interest with respect to the present litigation. Hav-
ing reached this conclusion, the client might well demand to be the
arbiter of the decision as to how his or her short-term and long-term
interests are to be balanced. Client-centered ethics provide no justifica-
tion for a refusal to allow the client to make a decision when the client
is willing to shoulder the responsibilty for the possiblity that, in the
long run, the decision is a mistake.
Having been driven into the corner by a client who understands
these issues, the lawyer will have to admit that the refusal to move to
disqualify is ultimately justified by the short- and long-term interests of
persons other than the client. That the refusal is probably also in the
long-run interest of the client is a bonus that may or may not mollify
the client and minimize the psychic dissonance of the attorney.
III. CONCLUSION
While changing judicial attitudes toward disqualification of coun-
sel86 can be expected to result in fewer wholly unjustifiable disqualifi-
cations, there will remain cases in which such disqualifications will take
place, and more numerous cases in which delay and expense will result
from the necessity of disposing of motions that should not have been
made. The responsibility for avoiding these abuses rests squarely on
the potentially moving counsel.
The ethical principles that should be relied upon in deciding
whether or not to move to disqualify opposing counsel represent a
modest departure from strictly client-centered ethics. It is desirable
that the departure be modest because legal ethics, as working ethics, are
properly constrained by those aspects of the social psychology of law-
yers that are unchangeable in the short and medium run.
The first and easiest departures are that lawyers must not make
frivolous motions and that they must inform the court of possible con-
flicts. While it would arguably be in the client's interest to ignore these
rules, compliance will rarely run seriously counter to the client's inter-
ests.
The remaining questions as to when it is ethically obligatory, per-
missible, and impermissible to move to disqualify opposing counsel for
conflict of interest will depend upon just how demanding a set of obli-
gations lawyers can be expected to follow. If a statistically significant
number of lawyers could not follow obligations more demanding than
those of client-centered ethics, then it will be permissible to move to
86. See notes 19-42 supra and accompanying text.
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disqualify opposing counsel in the "hard cases"-those cases in which
the elimination of the conflict is a minor matter relative to the losses
imposed upon the adverse party by the loss of counsel. Even under this
hypothesis, however, it would not be obligatory to move to disqualify
opposing counsel in these cases. Professional ethics can have ideals of
conduct even if only a small number of practitioners could live up to
them on a regular basis. The preferred conduct, and the course that
legal ethics should recommend is a weighing procedure that requires
some attention to the interests of the adverse party. This decision pro-
cedure is superior to that of client-centered ethics because it gives
proper scope to other values at the point that they take precedence over
the value of attorney loyalty to client.
If a statistically significant group of lawyers could follow obliga-
tions significantly more demanding than those of client-centered ethics,
then the weighing procedure should be an ethical obligation rather
than an ethical ideal. It would be ethically impermissible to move to
disqualify if the loss to the adverse party would be disproportionate, or
involve fundamental values. In borderline cases the attorney should
consider the prior conduct of the adverse party, the way the motion
would appear to the public, and whether it would adversely affect the
efficient provision of legal services.
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